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A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will
seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined
by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions; you have no
choice but to do what you are destined to do. Although this way of thinking has intuitive
appeal, and a long history, it has recently began to gain critical attention. A number of
arguments have been raised in defense of the idea that our will could be genuinely free
even if the universe is governed by deterministic laws of physics. Determinism and free will
have been argued to be compatible before, of course, but these recent arguments seem
to take a new step in that they are relying on a more profound and concrete view on the
central elements of the issue, the fundamental laws of physics and the nature of causal
explanation in particular. The basic idea of this approach is reviewed in here, and it is
shown how a careful analysis of physics and causal explanation can indeed enhance our
understanding of the issue. Although it cannot be concluded that the problem of free will
would now be completely solved (or dissolved), it is clear that these recent developments
can bring significant advancement to the debate.
Keywords: Block Universe, compatibilism, consequence argument, determinism, difference-making, free will,
incompatibilism, interventionism
PRELUDE
Physics is typically thought to paint a bleak picture of human existence. All there is, is a myriad
of soulless particles, aimlessly bouncing on each other in an infinite darkness. We, humans, and
all our actions, are nothing but products of such mechanistic interactions: everything we are, and
everything we do, is dictated by the behavior of simple material particles and the blind laws that
govern it. What we think, what we feel, and what we choose does not have an effect on the world;
we don’t really matter.
Recently, however, this view has began to receive growing critical attention [1–12]. Ismael [6] in
particular, a prominent philosopher of physics, has composed a book-length argument to challenge
our intuitive bleak view. Her aims inHow Physics Makes Us Free are ambitious: what she sets out to
do, in a nutshell, is to explain, not only how a proper understanding of physics does not force such
a bleak view of reality and ourselves on us, but how the thoroughly physical world and the laws
that govern its behavior actually enable us to be autonomous agents who are free to act according
to their conscious decisions.
Compatibilism—the idea that physical determinism and free will are ultimately compatible—is
not a new thesis, of course, but these recent arguments seem to take a new step in that they are
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relying on a more profound and detailed view on the central
elements of the issue: the fundamental laws of physics and the
nature of causal explanation. The following reviews the basic idea
of this approach. It is shown how a careful analysis of causal
explanation in the context of our current knowledge of physics
can indeed enhance our understanding of the issue. Although
it cannot be concluded that the problem of free will would
now be completely solved (or dissolved), it is clear that these
recent developments can bring significant advancement to the
debate.
FREE WILL AND AGENCY
Free will is a notoriously multifaceted and elusive notion. Most
treatments of the issue, even purely philosophical ones, rush
directly into deciphering the intricacies of determinism and
indeterminism, and their respective connections to the idea of
autonomous agency. However, it should be rather obvious that
before there can be such a thing as autonomous agency, which
may or may not be said to include the power to act according
to free choices, there needs to be an idea of who, or what, is
supposed to be the bearer of such an autonomous agency. To get
clear on such an idea is not a trivial undertaking.
The main thrust of the current discussion is naturalism: the
aim is to show how our common sense notions of agency and
free will can be reconciled with a thoroughly scientific world
view. Both dualism and eliminativism are typically rejected. This
leaves a rather narrow path to tread: on the one hand the aim
is to hold on to our common sense notions, or at least to the
core spirit of them, but on the other hand one is committed
to accepting the results of physics and other empirical sciences,
without a murmur. Ismael [6] defends an account of the self that
neither assumes the existence of immaterial souls nor accepts
“nolipsism,” an eliminativist “no-self view of the self ” (cf. also
[13]). What’s left in-between, Ismael [6] contends, is an account
of the self as “self-governor”: a view that leaves higher-level
conscious control intact, but gets rid of the homunculus-like
inner unity of the self that our naïve common sense easily
presupposes.
Filling in the details of the story of how such self-governors
arise, and giving a full account of what kind of an entity it
ultimately is, is a huge undertaking, that is bound to remain
largely speculative. However, even if the current ideas are thus
inevitably incomplete, it is not hard to find them credible, or at
least pointing to the right direction. Various levels and aspects
of agency are recognized and studied by biology, psychology,
and other empirical sciences, and even though there is still a lot
to find out and explain, there is little doubt that all of this will
be fully consistent with the basic physical understanding of the
world.
However, using the term “self-governor” does whet one’s
appetite for more specific information on what these thoroughly
biological governors are supposed to govern, and, more
burningly: how. To remove the air of mysticism around the
notion one needs to substantiate it with a solid, and completely
natural account of free will.
DETERMINISM, INDETERMINISM, AND
“THE REAL PROBLEM”
The first thing to note is that this discussion is taking place in
a perfectly classical, deterministic setting. Now, one could point
out, and rightly so, that the most basic physical level is quantum
mechanical, which in turn entails that physics is fundamentally
indeterministic, and that it would therefore be a mistake to
discuss the issue of free will in a deterministic setting.
There are many things to be said about this objection. First,
it is not at all self-evident what precisely the determinism-
indeterminism dichotomy amounts to, especially in the current
context (e.g., [4, 14, 15]). It is quite well-know that even
Newtonian mechanics allows the possibility of indeterministic
dynamics (e.g., [4, 14, 16, 17]). Additionally, both special and
general relativity leave room for indeterminism—the former
case is maybe not that widely known (cf. [14]), but the
latter case is generally accepted due to general relativity
allowing the possibility of (naked) spacetime singularities [4, 14,
18].
But more importantly, when you move from the classical
realm to quantum physics, things don’t become anymore straight
forward. Although it is the typical, received view that quantum
mechanics is fundamentally indeterministic—to the point where
quantum indeterminism is thought to give us the only real basis
for the idea of objective probability—the issue is far from settled.
According to the traditional “Copenhagen Interpretation” of
quantum mechanics elementary particles lack definite properties
prior to their measurement ([19–22]; cf. [23]). What’s striking
about this view, as the argument presented by Einstein et al. [24]
made apparent, is that this interpretation of quantum mechanics
violates the locality postulate of special relativity (the idea that
no signal can travel faster than light). Objectively indeterministic
quantum physics would thus lead to postulating “spooky action
at a distance,” which is absurd, according to Einstein et al. [24],
and we should therefore reject the idea that the indeterministic
interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us a complete theory
of reality.
However, the theoretical results of Bell [25–27], and their
subsequent empirical tests [28, 29] have shown us that no local
hidden-variable theory—i.e., no locally deterministic theory—
will agree with the empirical implications of quantummechanics,
or, conversely, as far as any such theory agrees with the
implications, it will not be local. In other words, our current
theoretical and empirical understanding of quantum mechanics
suggests that if there exists a deterministic formulation of
quantum mechanics, it will be non-local. And therefore, as
long as one is prepared to accept non-locality (something
that Einstein et al., [24] thought was absurd), it is perfectly
consistent, both theoretically and empirically, to give up on
the idea of indeterminism at the quantum level. And in fact,
Bell himself (cf. e.g., [30]) was a proponent of the Bohmian
interpretation of quantum mechanics—a variant of non-local
hidden-variable theory—and Bohm’s [31, 32] non-local theory,
which was generally neglected at the time of its introduction due
to its very non-local nature, and served as an impetus for Bell [25,
26] to derive his results. So even on the traditional (Copenhagen)
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interpretation of quantum mechanics can be deterministic—at
the price of locality.
Moreover, and more to the point, Bell [33–35] also admitted
that even local hidden-variable formulations of quantum
mechanics could still be consistent with his theoretical
results. Such formulations would just need to assume
“superdeterminism,” as he called it [33–35]. Now, this is a crucial,
and often neglected issue in the foundations of quantum physics.
The traditional understanding of quantum mechanics assumes
that the experimenter is free to make any given measurement.
And given this assumption, the indeterministic dynamics of the
elementary particles follows (as the recent theoretical results
of Conway and Kochen [36, 37] make explicit). However, why
should one be justified in making such an assumption? Why
couldn’t one deny that the experimenter is free to choose her
measurement, and claim that that event, like everything else in
the universe, was determined—or “superdetermined,” as Bell
[33–35] would say—to happen? And more burningly: isn’t this
the very issue that we’re faced with in relation to the problem
of determinism and free will? It is true that not many are
prepared to accept such “superdeterministic” quantum physics,
mainly because it seems to be a non-negotiable basic assumption
of empirical science that the experimenter is free to test the
reality (e.g., [38, 39]). However, at the same time it must be
acknowledged that it is clear that if the whole idea of agential
freedom is questioned, one cannot expect to give a satisfactory
answer to the question by simply assuming such freedom.
And this, ultimately, is the reason why the discussions on free
will and physics are typically assuming a deterministic—i.e., a
“superdeterministic”—framework.
However, given that such “superdeterminism” is typically
rejected in physics, it is instructive to rehearse the main reasons
for doubting the relevance of quantum physics in this context
(cf. [40]). According to the naturalistic view on the mind,
all our mental states and processes, our conscious decisions
among them, are grounded on electro-chemical processes in
neurons and neural networks. Although nerve cells seem tiny
to us, they are huge on a quantum scale. True, neurons
are composed of particles at smaller physical scales, and
ultimately of things at quantum scale. However, the relevant
level to consider here is the level of neuron, and neuron to
neuron communication; the initiation and propagation of action
potentials—the basis of all mental processes—are macrophysical
events, perfectly explainable in classical terms [41]. This is
the main physical reason to suppose that quantum physics
can be safely ignored in neuroscientific and psychological
contexts.
To be clear, it is true that quantum indeterminacies, supposing
that they are objective in the first place, cannot be completely
ignored at macroscopic scales. After all, radioactive decay
can be legitimately pointed to as the cause of injury to
biological organisms (which is something that Schrödinger’s
[42] famous cat thought-experiment dramatizes). However, it is
clear that the current neurosciences do not trade on quantum
indeterminacies. But more importantly, even if they would, it
is all but clear how that would affect the problem of free will.
The fundamental problem is that the idea of free will does not
seem to be incompatible only with determinism, but also with
indeterminism: random events are not willed. And this, to be
clear, is yet another, purely conceptual, reason to be skeptical
of the appeals to quantum physics in this context: replacing
the determinism of classical physics with the indeterminacy of
quantum physics would not, in itself, take us any step closer to
solving the problem of free will. It is thus important to realize
that the issue we are faced with the problem of free will is
multifaceted in a very profound way. The core issue can be
analyzed to divide itself into two separate problems, each of
which creates a conflict with the purely physical view on the
world in its own way [43]: the problem of the causal efficacy
of the mental—“the problem of the will”—and the problem of
the freedom of the will. Conflating these two problems can
be seen to be a source of many confusions and false hopes
surrounding the issue of free will. This, the following will
suggest, is ultimately also the case with respect to the recent
arguments inspired by amore concrete understanding of modern
physics.
Let us now dub this “The Hard” or “Real Problem of
Free Will”: free will presupposes both determinism and
indeterminism, but determinism and indeterminism are
mutually exclusive, and hence “free will” is an oxymoron. The
compatibilists are eager exploit this incoherence for their benefit:
not only does it show that the contrary to determinism is equally
detrimental to free will, but also how determinism is actually a
friend, rather than a foe of it. This is actually the main reason
why many are perfectly happy to settle with classical physics
in this debate: in its determinism it provides grounds for the
idea of wilful causal determination, which is something that
we need to tackle the problem of the causal efficacy of the
mental. However, even if one would grant that compatibilism
and incompatibilism are on a par with each other—the former
opting for compatibilism with respect to determinism, and the
latter with respect to indeterminism—this in itself does not make
the threat of determinism go away: the apparent incompatibility
of free will and determinism remains, and the compatibilists will
still need to give us a positive story on how the two are supposed
to fit together.
CAUSATION AND FREE WILL
The conflict between determinism and free will—or between
determinism and the freedom of the will, to be precise—can
be made tangible by the means of the consequence argument—
an explicit argument for the incompatibility of free will and
determinism [44, 45]. The incompatibility arises, according to the
argument, because our actions are entailed by the conjunction
of the initial conditions of the universe and the deterministic
laws of nature, and if we were to decide to act differently,
one of the conjuncts (or both) would need to be changed (to
avoid contradiction). So the idea that you would be able to
act according to your free choices leads to the absurdity that
you would be able to change the laws of nature or the initial
conditions of the universe (or both).
Let us formulate this argument more precisely. Let A be an
action performed at a time t1, let S be a sentence that expresses
the complete state of the universe in a distant point in the past
t0, let L be the set of all the fundamental laws of physics, and let
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determinism be the thesis that the conjunction of S and L entails
every event in the universe. Now we can argue:
(1) No agent can perform¬S or¬L at time t1. (Assumption)
(2) An agent performs A at time t1. (Assumption)
(3) An agent could have performed ¬A at time t1.
(Assumption/Free will)
(4) (S∧ L)⇒A (Assumption/Determinism)
(5) ¬A⇒¬(S∧ L) (Contraposition from 4)
(6) An agent could have performed ¬(S ∧ L) at time t1.
(Substituting 5 to 3)
(7) 6 contradicts 1. (1 and 6)
(8) 3 is false.
One way to approach this issue in the context of physics is to
eliminate causation altogether—on the grounds that there is no
room for such an asymmetric notion in fundamental physics—
and then claim that there is no real problem of our decisions
being causally effective because there is no such thing as causation
in the first place. However, if one is determined to tread the
narrow path of naturalism, one is also bound to hold on to the
notion of causation—in particular, the idea that we are, or can be
at times at least, genuine sources of our actions. The way to do
this, the idea is, is to adopt a precise—particularly “scientific,” as
many are eager to stress—view on causation, that treats causal
claims as claims about hypothetical results in counterfactual
scenarios (e.g., [46–48]). The basic idea, very concisely, is that you
first specify a set of variables (e.g., {C, E}) and a set of structural
equations defining the relationships of these variables [e.g., if
(C = 1, then E = 1) and (if C = 0, then E = 0)], and you
then identify causal relations with the pattern of correlations you
will find among the variables under hypothetical changes in the
values of the variables; C is a cause of E, for example, just in case
interventions on the value of C will result in changes in the value
of E.
Although there are various specifications to be made, and
details to be filled in—and problems to tackle—this is currently
a widely accepted way to approach causation, and corresponds
well to the way causal inference works in everyday science.
However, even if this view of causation is not taken to be
particularly problematic, it is a whole other issue how it should
be applied to the age-old problem of free will. What Ismael
[6] tries to do is, first, to define the notion of “pivotal role”
in terms of interventions that serve a particularly effective—
“pivotal”—role in a given domain, and second, to identify
free will with such a pivotal role. This view could be seen
to find support from Lagnado et al. [49], who provide an
illuminating empirical account on how pivotal control connects
to responsibility attributions, and moral responsibility, in turn,
is arguably something that we are tracking with our free will
attributions. Steward [11] offers a closely related account in
which free will is connected to thermodynamically open systems
that are “true producers.” On this view, what free will therefore
is, in effect, is “pivotal control,” and a person can be said to
have such “pivotal control over a certain kind of behavior just
in case decision plays a pivotal role in its production” ([6], p.
239). That causal sources should be identified with such pivotal
“control variables” [50], “difference-makers” [51–55], “handles”
[56–58] or “necessary conditions” [12] is well-entrenched in the
current discussion, and it could be argued that the seeds to
this view were sown already by Mackie [59, 60] who defined
causes as INUS conditions: insufficient but necessary parts of
conditions which are itself unnecessary but sufficient for their
effects.
So far so good. It is not too difficult to see how in certain
places of the vast network of physical interactions you can have
nexuses—pivotal areas—that channel some of the interactions
in a particularly salient way, and it is not too big a stretch to
identify conscious decision making with a certain subset of such
nexuses, given that you are in the business of trying to give
a perfectly naturalistic explanation of such things. This sounds
like a coherent and credible picture. However, it is a further
question whether this offers a new solution to the problem of free
will, and most importantly, whether such a solution is ultimately
successful.
The problem is that when you scratch the surface, it starts to
look like the fundamental issues of the free will debate are left
largely untouched. Most of the ammunition in the discussion
is spent on giving a naturalistic account of decision making
and action production. However, whether our decisions are
truly effective, and whether their effectiveness can be explained
in naturalistic terms, is not the core question of free will—
the incompatibilists have no quarrel with the idea that we act
according to conscious decisions, even if determinism holds.
Rather, the core question is this: are we free to make the decisions
according to which we act? In other words—and this is not a
completely innocent reformulation, to be clear—are we faced
with genuine alternatives when wemake our decisions, and could
we have chosen to act otherwise in cases where we happened to
act according to our conscious decisions [premise (3) above]? It
seems that the problem of the freedom of the will has become
conflated with the problem of the causal efficacy of the will.
This critique can bemademore precise in places. For example,
it seems that Ismael [6] is simply embracing the conclusion of
the consequence argument—that to her it is simply not absurd
to think that we can change either the initial conditions of the
universe or the laws of nature (or both): “[b]ut the question is”—
she urges us to ask—“[w]hy should we hold fixed the past and the
laws of nature?” (p. 190). Well, the argument is a reductio, and it
assumes that we have strong intuitive reasons to think that both
things in the distant past and the laws of nature are out of the
scope of our influence. You can get out of the contradiction that
the argument imposes by simply denying that the argument is
a reductio, of course. But if this is the solution one is offering,
it would be useful indeed if that would be made explicit (by
connecting it to Lewis [61] classical account, for example).
In places it also feels that the argumentation comes close to
mixing the worries stemming from the apparent incompatibility
of free will and determinism with the worries stemming from
fatalism:
“Deliberating is like following your own footsteps through an
untouched desert. The footsteps are real, and others who come
after you can follow them. But you put them there in the act
Frontiers in Physics | www.frontiersin.org 4 December 2017 | Volume 5 | Article 64
Pernu Can Physics Make Us Free?
of walking. They aren’t there before, and they aren’t “there
anyway.” You don’t follow your own footsteps. They might
lead others, but they don’t lead you.” ([6], p. 168.)
“Fate is what happens. It doesn’t determine your actions. Your
actions determine fate.” ([6], p. 214.)
It is a fallacy—the fatalist fallacy—to think that if determinism
holds then your decisions and actions don’t matter, and
everything is fixed and happens as it happens irrespective of
you. What moves the incompatibilist is not the worry that our
actions and decisions don’t matter, but the worry that they are
fully determined by matters outside of our control. Again, a clear
separation of the problem of the freedom of the will from the
problem of the causal efficacy of the will would be welcome
indeed.
However, there does seem to be a few threads of ideas that
might be interpreted to have a bite on these fundamental issues
and spark some genuine advancement in the debate. For example,
Ismael [6] is clear, at least in places, that she thinks that the laws
of nature are not indeed constant (or at least not in the sense that
the debate typically assumes), and that this is the key to solving
the puzzle of free will. “What might it mean to say that the laws
relate to the History of the universe in something like the way
that the property of being a tragedy relates to the stories to which
it applies?,” she asks rather metaphorically ([6], p. 176; cf. also
[4]). Now, if the laws of nature fail to be constant, and, more
specifically, if we and our decisions are part of the “unfolding”
of the universe—as we clearly must be, since we are definitely
not outside observers either—then it is indeed the case that the
consequence argument does not look like a reductio anymore
since our actions do in fact change the laws of nature—simply
because our actions are not separate consequences of them.
However, if this is what the argument really amounts to, it could
have, and should have been stated much more clearly. Note also
that this move seems to entail a tacit shift from compatibilism
to incompatibilism: if there is a sense in which our actions can
influence the laws of nature, then surely the laws of nature are
not deterministic anymore? It seems that a number of things in
this view call for clarification.
AN ARGUMENTATIVE ASCENT TO FREE
WILL
It seems that there are concurrently three different, but
interconnected arguments at play. First, it is noted that even if
the fundamental deterministic laws of physics would be quite
simple, any real system will exhibit such a level of complexity
that it will be theoretically impossible to predict the behavior
of the system (to make an accurate prediction you would need
to specify not only the values of all the variables endogenous to
the system, but also the values of all the exogenous variables,
and hence ultimately the values of all the variables that specify
the state of the universe as a whole). So given that we can never
perceive more than an approximation of the state of the universe,
there will always be a set of alternative courses of events (histories
and futures) consistent with the currently perceived state of the
universe. A devoted incompatibilist would quickly note, however,
that this follows simply from our subjective perspective and
limited cognitive capacities, and in no way challenges the fact
that the given initial conditions and deterministic laws of nature
entail only one possible (actual), real course of events. On the
other hand one could still maintain that this gives us a precisely
defined set of epistemically possible courses of events, which
could ground at least our sense of free will.
Second, there are also appeals to the fact how the fundamental
laws of physics are assumed to be symmetric under time reversal,
and how in current (relativistic) physics time is not treated as an
external parameter. This is a very important point, and although
this is no news to philosophy of physics, these issues have not
been receiving the attention they deserve in discussions related to
free will. A moment’s reflection should make it clear that taking
these fairly simple facts into account could change the discussion
significantly. For one, it would now appear that affecting the
future and affecting the past are on a par with each other. That
is, if the past-future asymmetry that we perceive is illusory (from
the perspective of fundamental physics), then it is nomore absurd
to think that we can change the initial conditions of the universe
than it is to think that we can change the future events. In fact,
future events would now seem to affect—or at least correlate
with—the past. When we worry about the possibility of free will
under determinism, the argument would now go, we tacitly posit
an outside observer inspecting the events from a superreal frame
of reference. In particular, the consequence argument seems to
assume a mistaken view on reality where the initial conditions
and laws of nature are fixed somewhere in the past, and where
we appear to the scene at some later point in time, after which
everything is run like in an ingeniously written film. But where
exactly is this past fixing happening, and who has written this
film—and who is watching it? It is clearly right to maintain that
once we see that we have to let go of this image, we will start
to see ourselves as integral parts of the universe—as parts of its
initial conditions and laws—and the force of the consequence
arguments starts to evaporate. If we, and our decisions and
actions, are simply parts of the fabric of the spacetime continuum,
it may not be that absurd to claim that our free choices alter either
the initial conditions of the universe or the laws of nature (or
both): “there is no support in physics for the idea that the past
is ‘fixed’ in some way that the present and future are not, or that
it has some ontological power to constrain our actions that the
present and future do not have” [4].
Finally, there is a third argument that is based on the results
of the previous two. Consider first an incompatibilist response
to the second argument: surely, if the past and the future are
symmetrically dependent on each other, this just proves that there
is no free will—that we cannot affect the future while holding past
(and laws of nature) constant. Now one could point out—and
arguably this is something that this argumentation is ultimately
trying to get at—that such a response simply does notmake sense;
that one must admit either that our choices can affect both the
past and the future (which renders the consequence argument
invalid) or that the whole idea of causing and affecting is ill-
founded (which renders debate surrounding the notion of free
will thoroughly meaningless). If one now maintains that the idea
of causing and affecting is non-negotiable, but is simultaneously
also reluctant to hold the past and the future symmetrical (and
thus accept the first horn of the dilemma), then one has to admit
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that in this context we are forced to consider only subsystems
of the actual universe. That is, only in such (open) subsystems
does the past-future and cause-effect asymmetries hold (and the
causation defined in interventionist terms make sense): “if you
wish to include the whole universe in the model”, as Pearl [47]
notes, “causality disappears because interventions disappear—
the manipulated and the manipulator lose their distinction” (p.
349–350; cf. also [62–64]). But now the first argument kicks
back in: each subsystem under inspection is always a member
of a set of equally possible subsystems consistent with the given
initial conditions and laws of nature. In other words, dividing the
universe into subsystems is necessary for the idea of causing and
affecting to make sense, which in turn allows the simultaneous
existence of alternative possibilities, which in turn can ground the
idea of the ability to do otherwise, and, consequently, the idea of
free will.
FROM THE BLOCK UNIVERSE TO THE
BUBBLED BLOCK UNIVERSE
Here is an attempt to make this argumentation more precise.
It seems that the consequence argument is tacitly relying on an
ill-licensed asymmetry. The argument assumes that our actions
are consequences of the initial conditions and laws of nature
[premise (4) above]. However, this is only half of the truth, for it
is equally true, it has now become apparent, to say that the initial
conditions and laws of nature are consequences of our actions.
The reason why this sounds absurd is that we are tacitly imposing
an imbalanced interpretation on the relevant variables. All parties
in the debate agree that in order for the consequence argument
to have any chances of getting off the ground both S and L must
describe the complete state of the universe and the complete set
of fundamental laws of nature, respectively, down to the smallest
detail and perfect accuracy. What seems to have gone unnoticed,
however, is that what follows from such a complete description
is not the coarse-grained events that we typically identify as our
actions, but a complete state of the universe, down to the smallest
detail. Once this discursive asymmetry has been exposed, and the
content of A is set on a par with S and L, the air of absurdity
between the symmetrical dependency between these variables
starts to evaporate.
If A would now refer to a complete chunk of the universe
at a time t1, rather than anything we would normally call an
action, then it would indeed be intuitively absurd to say that
an agent could cause anything like A to occur. That is, now the
premise (2), that is typically not being questioned, would become
undermined. In other words, if we think that our actions are
logical consequences of the initial conditions and the laws of
nature, then our actions are not caused by us (simply because
they are not caused by anything). If, on the other hand, we want
to hold onto the causal discourse—as both compatibilists and
incompatibilists typically do—and maintain that our actions are
caused by us, then either wemust admit that the initial conditions
and the laws of nature are causally dependent on our actions, or
we must break the symmetry between the two. Since the former
sounds absurd, we opt for the latter. But in that case there is no
reason to hold onto the premise (4) anymore. The dependency
stated by (4) was supposed to be holding between symmetrically
related elements of reality. Now that this symmetry is gone, there
is no reason to believe in the asymmetric dependency either.
To put this more formally, instead of (4) we should have the
following:
(4∗)1 (S ∧ L)⇔ (A ∧ L)
This in turn entails not only (4), but also:
(9) (A ∧ L)⇒ (S ∧ L)
There is no less reason to interpret (9) in causal terms as there is
to do so with respect to (4); since (4∗) is not expressing a causal
dependence, neither should (4) nor (9). In other words, A can be
a consequence of (S ∧ L) only if (S ∧ L) is also a consequence
of A (and the laws of nature), and if you want to deny the latter
[i.e., (9)], you must also deny the former [i.e., (4)]. If you want
to hold onto the idea that A is causally—asymmetrically, that
is—dependent on an agent [i.e., (2)], then “A” cannot refer to
the same thing in (2) as it does in (4∗), (4), and (9). So if you
move into the realm of causation, and detach yourself from (4∗),
you ipso facto detach yourself from (4) and (9). There can still
be determinism of a sort; (4∗) and its consequences can still be
true. There is no causal determinism, however, and what (4∗), (4),
and (9) express are purely logical or mathematical dependencies.
What S and A are, in effect, are simply arbitrary chunks of the
entire spacetime block that constitutes the universe. Once you
realize that, there is no less reason to accept (9) as there is to
accept (4): A could simply stand for the final conditions of the
universe, and since the laws that govern the evolution of the
universe are symmetric, the totality of the final conditions of the
universe entail the totality of the initial conditions as much as the
other way around. However, neither of these are a cause of the
1To be precise, this assumes that the initial conditions and the laws of nature can
be separated from each other, and that the latter are constant [which grounds the
symmetry between the “past” (S) and the “future” (A)]. However, neither of these
assumptions can be taken for granted. First, are we empirically justified in thinking
that the laws of nature are constant? Einstein [65, 66] and Dirac [67] already
suggested the possibility that some of the fundamental physical constants might
not be time-invariant, and a number of recent studies have indicated that that
might actually be the case (cf. e.g., [68–73]). The ramifications of such a conclusion
would of course be radical, and it would entail (prima facie) that determinism does
not hold at any scale (or that the whole notion would collapse). Second, if we
are relying on a Humean (as opposed to non-Humean or Aristotelian) account
of the laws of nature (as those proposing this line of argumentation typically
are), then we cannot, in principle, separate L from S—what we actually have
is only S encompassing everything. That is because L (and all other “necessary
connections”) supervene on the entire “Humean mosaic” of spacetime points, and
they are not something that are over and above the spacetime, separately guiding
or governing the evolution of the universe.“All there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another”, as Lewis
([74], p. ix) puts the idea (cf. also [75]). The laws of nature are simply theorems
of the best systematization of this Humean mosaic. What this would then seem to
entail is that any changes anywhere in the spacetime would result in changes in the
laws (since chains of events are not driven by the laws of nature but exactly the
opposite). This would again radically transform the basic elements of the debate,
and maybe puts Ismael’s ([6], p. 176) metaphor about the laws of nature relating to
the evolution of the universe in the same way as the property of being a tragedy
relates to the stories to which it applies in the right metaphysical context (cf.
also [4]).
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other, or, if you would insist on using causal terminology, both
are equal causes of each other.
The key issue here is the scope of A. If A has a wide scope—
if it refers to some complete chunk of the spacetime—then it
can be argued that (4) should be replaced by (4∗), and that (4)
holds only if (9) also holds. However, one could now insist that
if A has a narrow scope—if it refers only to a tiny piece of the
complete chunk of the universe—then (4∗) and (9) fail to hold,
but (4) still holds. In other words, the right sort of asymmetry
could be reintroduced back into the argument if one just gives
A a narrow interpretation. Moreover, one is fully justified in
giving such a narrow interpretation because A was supposed to
be referring to a specific action performed by the agent all along,
not to an enormous non-localized chunk of the entire universe.
More precisely, let A now refer to a finite conjunction of events
A = (a1 ∧ . . . ∧ an), and let a1 be the action performed (i.e., an
event produced) by an agent at t1. Now instead of (4) and (4∗) we
have:
(10) (S ∧ L)⇒ a1
While (10) is consistent with (4∗), and therefore also with (4) and
(9), the following does not hold:
(11) a1⇒ (S ∧ L)
This seems like something that the incompatibilist has been
insisting all along. Your actions are consequences of the initial
conditions and laws of nature, but not the other way around.
Even if there would be symmetrical dependencies at the level of
the entire universe, there are no such symmetries at the level of
single localized events that constitute your actions.
However—and this is the final twist in the story—this
point exactly exposes the ill-licensed asymmetrical reasoning the
incompatibilist is relying on. In (10) the antecedent contains
quite literally everything, whereas the consequent contains an
arbitrary chosen event from a myriad of events that are taking
place at the given time, each of which could equally well play
the role of a1 in (10). That is, the antecedent in (10) gives
simply a sufficient condition for a1 to occur. But the focus of
the debate has been on the causes of our actions, on the issue
of whether performing a particular action is “up to us,” and
causes in turn, we have learnt, are something else than mere
sufficient conditions: they are not only sufficient, but also—
and first and foremost—necessary for their effects; causes are
the pivotal difference-makers of their effects, something without
which the effects would not have occurred. But (10) is silent
about such a pivotal role; nothing in it states what is necessary
in the antecedent for a1 to occur. Maybe some proper part of
it is, but definitely not all of it. To get at the genuine causes of
events we need to inspect the effects and see how they respond
to changes elsewhere in the given system. In particular, we need
find out what we need to remove from the system to remove
the effect—we need to find out what was necessary, in the given
circumstances, for the effect to occur. Once we hit that, we are
on a track to nailing the cause of the effect. For any of this to
make sense we need to be able to compare different systems to
each other—and we need to do this from within another, more
encompassing system; we need to assume a position from which
we can hypothesize that when some things are held constant—
when most of the universe is held constant—it is true to say of
some subsystem of the universe that if the cause-event would not
have occurred in that system, then the effect-event would also
have been absent. The initial conditions and laws of nature are
not the causes of effects, but rather the background conditions in
the light of which particular causal hypotheses can be formulated
and tested; they simply form the basis of the general framework
that enables us to engage in a causal discourse.
Now, what we typically call actions are rather coarse-grained
events. Greeting somebody, let’s say, can materialize in various
different ways—as various different locutions and as various
different bodily movements. Fine physical details are thus
irrelevant to any given greeting-event. Therefore, to get to the
causes of such greeting-events, we need to find out, not what the
entire detailed history of the universe was prior to the occurrence
of the given event, but what a very minor part of that history
was necessary for the occurrence of that event; all the rest is
simply irrelevant noise. And the things that play the right sort
of pivotal role to get to be pinpointed as causes of greeting-
events are arguably something equally coarse-grained: they are
mental states—perceptions, desires, and beliefs—coupled with
cultural and social constraints. Such things too, like greetings,
can materialize in various different ways, and neither are their
occurrences dependent on fine physical details (cf. [76–79]). In
other words, the causal system under scrutiny is such that it
allows for a myriad of fine-grained physical possibilities and a
wide range of variation in the initial conditions; many different
physical systems are consistent with our actions and the mental
states that cause them. And this physical leeway, the argument
would now go, is what ultimately grounds our free will: our
actions are not dependent on the initial conditions of the
universe—even if they (together with the deterministic laws of
nature) would be sufficient for everything that happens—but
only on a relevant subset of the events antecedent to the actions,
leaving it possible for alternative courses of events to take place.
What the consequence argument seems to presuppose, then,
is both that the initial conditions of the universe together with
the deterministic laws of nature entail our actions and that our
actions are caused by us. On a closer look, however, this turns out
to be an incoherent presupposition. What the initial conditions
and the laws of nature entail is quite literally everything.
Therefore, they entail, rather trivially, also our actions. What the
initial conditions and the laws of nature do not do, however, is to
cause our actions—simply because they do not cause anything.
They are grounds for everything, but causes for nothing. If, then,
we want to hold onto the idea that there are causal relations in the
world, relations between us and our actions among them, then
we are committed to limit our inspection on proper subsystems
of the universe. What we need to do, we could say, is to move
from the Block Universe into a bubble within: from the idea
of an unchanging four dimensional, all encompassing block of
spacetime to a view from within such a block, a bubble where
causes and effects can take place, surrounded by a plethora of
equally possible, alternative bubbles. To put this more formally,
we can define “small world” as an assignment of values to all
the endogenous variables in a causal model, and “large world”
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as an assignment of values to both all the endogenous and all
the exogenous variables in such a model (cf. [47, 80]. From
the perspective of the “large world,” any “small world” bubble
would then be an equiprobable alternative to all the other “small
world” bubbles; from within our bubble, where causes and effects
can take place, we are always presented with alternatives, other
bubbles where things turn out differently (Figure 1). Fromwithin
our bubble, therefore, we are presented with various options, and
when we act on our free choices, we are always able to behave in
more than one way. What we get, then, is, as Hoefer [3] puts it,
“freedom from the inside out”.
THE INCOMPATIBILIST STRIKES BACK:
LESSONS FROM THE SECOND LAW
Disarming the consequence argument comes therefore in two
stages. First, the asymmetry of determinism that the argument
rests on is rejected: from the perspective of the fundamental
laws of physics the present, or any future state of the universe
entails any past state of it as much as vice versa. Second, once we
turn our focus on the asymmetries we perceive, most notably to
the temporal and causal asymmetries that constantly surround
us, the symmetric determinism imposed by the fundamental
laws of physics evaporates, and we are actually faced with
overwhelming degrees of microphysical freedom. Our decisions
and the actions resulting from them are thus macrophysical,
emergent phenomena for the simple reason that causation is a
macrophysical, emergent phenomenon. There is no causation
at the fundamental physical level, but that does not make
causation any less real. And similarly free will, the idea now is,
“is no more ruled out by the consequence argument than the
Second Law of Thermodynamics is ruled out by microscopic
reversibility” ([81]; cf. also [1]). Elzein et al. [82] dub this
sort of view “Supervenient Libertarianism,” for it postulates
genuine, libertarian free will—free will that presupposes the
availability of alternative possibilities—as a real higher-level
phenomenon that supervenes on, or emerges from, lower-
level deterministic dynamics (Backmann [83] uses the term
“Humean Libertarianism” for a similar view).2 By acting freely we
can therefore bring about—causally determine—macrophysical
changes in the future, but not in the past, although the future
logically determines the past (and vice versa).
So what this account does not commit us to is some sort
of backward causation, anymore than—and exactly to the same
extent as—the Second Law commits us to water spontaneously
boiling at a room temperature. That is, the total entropy of the
universe practically never decreases (to any significant extent),
although there exists a small likelihood that that might actually
happen. In fact, as the fluctuation theorem indicates [84–86],
and the subsequent experimental evidence shows [87–89], if
we are inspecting a small enough system (or in principle any
isolated system in a state of maximum entropy), the total entropy
2It is worth noting, however, that this view is in prima facie conflict with the formal
results of Conway and Kochen [36, 37] which suggest macroscopic freedom (the
freedom of the experimenter to take measurements) entails indeterminism at the
microphysical level.
FIGURE 1 | Bubbled Block Universe, where S is the complete set of initial
conditions (the low-entropy Big Bang) at the time-coordinate t0, L is the
complete set of all the fundamental laws of physics, A is a complete state of
spacetime at the time-coordinate t1, and a1 is a specific action performed at
t1. The action a1 is a macrophysical event, and there is therefore a set of
equiprobable (mutually exclusive) microphysical states (p1–p4) that are
consistent with the occurrence of a1. Supposing that w1 represents the actual
circumstances (that a1 occurs and is realized by p1), the subsystems w2–w4
represent the possible, non-actual alternatives to w1. In other words, from the
perspective of a1 each of the systems w1–w4 are equally possible. (Figure not
to scale.)
of the system will fluctuate, and in such systems time—and
causation—will actually run backwards (or back and forth). Or,
to be more precise, from within such a system nothing would
seem to run in reverse—exactly because the fundamental laws
governing the dynamics of the system are reversible; things
would run “backwards” only because we are observing the system
from the outside. Local, momentary backward influences are
therefore a physical fact, and although our actions will always
be accompanied by such minute rippling backward influences,
they will evaporate before we are able to perceive them, and they
are of no practical use to us. So although we can—and do—exert
backward causal influence, we posses only forward causal, pivotal
control: we can only bring about changes in the future, although
our actions influence also the past. If this sounds absurd, it is only
because our intuition is holding onto an absolute and objective
distinction between the past and the future, which is something
that has no ground in current physics.
Can we now rest assured that the correct understanding of
physics will deliver us from all our worries concerning free will
and agency? Unfortunately not. The most burning question is
this: can we really defeat the consequence argument by relying
on symmetric determinism at the microphysical level while at
the same time holding onto temporal and causal asymmetries
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at the macrophysical level? Macrophysical asymmetries are
of course consistent with microphysical symmetries, and this
relationship can be seen to ground the temporal and causal
asymmetries that surround us, as Carroll [81] notes. However,
is noting this connection really enough to undermine the
consequence argument? More specifically: why wouldn’t the
incompatibilist be now entitled to insist that it was determination
in the macrophysical, asymmetric sense all along that has been
keeping her awake at nights, and that nothing that has been
said above has challenged that sort of determinism—on the
contrary, hasn’t it now simply been given a solid footing in
current physics? The initial charge was that the incompatibilist
has been relying on causal determinism when in fact there is no
such thing in fundamental symmetric physics. However, once an
explanation is given to the perceivedmacrophysical asymmetries,
and causal determinism is thus brought back in—albeit in terms
of probability distributions—the incompatibilist could simply
now restate her case in macrophysical terms. If any backward
influences that might accompany our actions are negligible
compared to their forward influences, as the argument went,
then surely the incompatibilist could simply point out that now
every decision and every action is preceded by events that exert
stronger influence on those decisions and actions than vice versa?
We cannot reverse the growth of entropy, and we cannot reverse
the direction of causation, and we cannot change the events in
the past that determine our behavior—and hence we are not free
to choose the courses of our actions, the incompatibilist could
now insist.
It is important to understand, however, that we are not back to
square one. It is true that the consequence argument is typically
phrased, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of microphysical
determinism. The traditional, Laplacean, worry is that if we
only knew the exact, detailed state of the universe at some
moment in time, we could, if the fundamental laws of nature
are deterministic, and we would posses complete knowledge of
them too, calculate all the future events in perfect precision and
absolute certainty. The incompatibilist argumentation based on
this traditional worry has now been shown to be misguided:
it is not absurd to think that you acting differently than you
actually did would change the past simply because at the scale
of the entire universe the past and the future are symmetrically
related, and hence all future changes would, as a matter of
physical fact, result in changes in the past. This is an important
observation, and a real advancement in the debate. However,
the compatibilists have been too quick, it would now seem, to
conclude that the consequence argument is invalid and that we
can therefore have such a thing as free will in a deterministic
universe. The initial conditions (or the state of the universe at any
arbitrary point in time in the past), S, could now be interpreted
in macrophysical terms, encompassing all the microphysical
variation that is compatible with the macrophysical evolution
of the universe between t0 and t1. In other words, all the
microphysical leeway that there might be is simply irrelevant,
since all these microphysical states will converge into the same
macrophysical states that constitute our particular decisions
and actions, and you would have to be able to change the
macrophysical, low-entropy state of the universe in order to have
free will and be able to act otherwise. But such an entropic
reversal is practically impossible at the scale of our interest,
as those exploiting the microphysical symmetries to defeat the
consequence argument are eager to stress.
There is another, perhaps a more tangible way of phrasing
the problem we are now faced with. What the argumentation
reviewed in here may have been able to achieve, is to show
how we can be genuine causal agents in a thoroughly physical
world—how we, by making conscious decisions, can initiate
actions and exert control on future courses of events. This
would be a major achievement, of course. It would show that the
widespread worries about our mental states being causally inert
are misguided. But that, however, as it has already been stressed,
would only address a part of the issue we are facing with the
problem of free will. Another, and arguably more fundamental
issue has been left unaddressed: the question of whether we are
truly free to make the decisions that give rise to our actions.
So the core problem is not really that the rest of the universe
determines our actions; the problem is that it determines our
decisions. And in fact, as the preceding discussion arguably
shows, the first worry can now be dispensed with: we, rather
than the rest of the universe, might indeed function as genuine,
pivotal difference-makers with regard to our actions—we, and
our decisions and actions might actually matter. We might be, as
it were, indispensable cogs in the vast clockwork of the universe,
the removals of which would make things run differently. There
remains the worry, however, that every movement of the cogs
would still be determined by the prior movements of some of
the other cogs in the clockwork; that our decisions would be
fully determined by factors beyond our sphere of influence. To
address that worry, and to successfully soothe it, one would need
to show that our decisions are underdetermined by prior events,
or, to put it in current parlance, that there are no prior events
one can point to as pivotal difference-makers with regard to
our decisions. But such an argument, it now becomes apparent,
would seem to be missing.
There is a gap, therefore, that would need to be closed to
complete the argument sketched here. It has been too quick to
note that “free will is no more ruled out by the consequence
argument than the Second Law of Thermodynamics is ruled
out by microscopic reversibility” [81]. We can offer a consistent
physical story on how the macroscopic irreversibility emerges
from the microscopic reversibility, and maybe we can, in the way
outlined here, ground causal relations, genuine mental causation
among them, on such macroscopic asymmetries. But that would
only explain how our will can make a difference. To fully solve
the problem of free will—to tackle the issue of the freedom of
the will—one would also need to explain how that will could
be free.
CODA
It might be true that the past 100 years or so has not brought
much progress in the debate on free will, as some have claimed;
all involved in the debate, philosophers, and scientists, may have
been talking more past each other than to—or with—each other.
At the same time, it is clear that major advancements have been
made in closely related issues in philosophy of science and in
philosophy of mind, and, most obviously, in physics and other
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natural sciences. It might thus not be too audacious to claim that
we might well soon be witnessing some progress in this issue
as well—maybe it is just the question of putting all the pieces
together the right way.
Although the recent developments reviewed here leave many
questions in the air, and often the discussion could benefit from
a more systematic framing of the most fundamental issues in
the debate, the general framework of the argumentation is very
enticing indeed, and fits quite nicely into the more encompassing
story that the naturalistic philosophy and the empirical sciences
have been putting together for half a century or so. Even if these
developments would not turn out to constitute the event that
made us turn the leaf of history on this matter, theymost certainly
will be something that the future will hold as pivotal in the chain
of events that resulted in that turn.
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